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Abstract: 
The assessment of productivity change over time and its drivers is of great significance for 
water companies and regulators when setting urban water tariffs. This issue is even more 
relevant in privatized water industries, such as those in England and Wales, where the 
price-cap regulation is adopted. In this paper, an input-distance function is used to estimate 
productivity change and its determinants for the English and Welsh water-only companies 
(WoCs) over the period 1993-2009. The impacts of several exogenous variables on 
companies’ efficiencies are also explored. From a policy perspective, this study describes 
how regulators can use this type of modeling and results to calculate illustrative X factors 
for the WoCs. The results indicate that the 1994 and 1999 price reviews stimulated 
technical change and there were small efficiency gains. However, the 2004 price review did 
not accelerate efficiency change or improve technical change. The results also indicated 
that during the whole period of study, the excessive scale of the WoCs contributed 
negatively to productivity growth. On average, WoCs reported relatively high efficiency 
levels, which suggests that they had already been investing in technologies that reduce 
long-term input requirements with respect to exogenous and service-quality variables. 
Finally, an average WoC needs to improve its productivity toward that of the best company 
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by 1.58%. The methodology and results of this study are of great interest to both regulators 
and water-company managers for evaluating the effectiveness of regulation and making 
informed decisions. 
Keywords: productivity growth; service quality; efficiency; regulation; water industry; 
technical change 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In many countries, the water and sewerage industry is regulated because water services are 
provided through a monopoly regime. In this context, the assessment of the total factor 
productivity (TFP) has been evidenced as a useful tool for both water companies and 
regulators. The importance of evaluating productivity growth is especially marked in 
countries where the performance evaluation of water companies is part of the process of 
setting water tariffs [Maziotis et al., 2016a]. While there are several countries whose 
process to update water tariffs is based on price-cap regulation [Marques, 2011], the 
English and Welsh water industry has become a paradigmatic case [Molinos-Senante et al., 
2016]. 
After the privatization of the water companies in England and Wales in 1989, the regulator 
(Ofwat) adopted the RPI-K price-cap methodology to regulate the water industry [Saal and 
Reid, 2004] (see more details in section 2). Moreover, since the privatization, there have 
been two types of water companies operating in England and Wales: Water and Sewerage 
Companies (WaSCs) and Water Only Companies (WoCs) [Molinos-Senante et al., 2015a]. 
Given the importance of the productivity-growth estimation in the framework of the 
English and Welsh water-industry regulation, several researchers have assessed the TFPs of 
the water companies in England and Wales. To this end, from a methodological point of 
view, three main approaches have been used. Most of the previous studies employed 
stochastic-frontier techniques to provide TFP growth estimates [Saal and Parker, 2000; 
2001; 2006; Botasso and Conti, 2009a; 2009b; Saal et al., 2007]. A second methodological 
approach based on index numbers was applied by Maziotis et al. [2015; 2016a]. In addition, 
alternative productivity indices (Malmquist, Luenberger, Färe-Primont) based on non-
parametric techniques were also employed to evaluate TFP changes of water companies in 
England and Wales [Portela et al., 2011; Molinos-Senante et al., 2014; 2016; Maziotis et 
al., 2016b]. 
In spite of the methodological differences among these previous studies, all of them have in 
common that they evaluated the productivity growth of WaSCs or WaSCs and WoCs. 
However, with the exception of Bottasso and Conti [2009a], none of the previous papers 
focused exclusively on English and Welsh WoCs. In this context, it should be highlighted 
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that Saal and Parker [2006] and Molinos-Senante et al. [2015a] evidenced that English and 
Welsh WaCs and WoCs operate under different technologies and therefore cannot be 
modelled together. 
In the framework of benchmarking studies applied to the water industry, the importance of 
accounting for the operational environment in which the water companies are working has 
been illustrated [Carvalho and Marques, 2011]. Thus, some exogenous factors, along with 
the quality of the service provided by water companies, may influence their operational 
costs [Saal et al., 2007; De Witte and Marques, 2010]. Hence, it is essential to integrate 
these variables into productivity-growth assessment. This issue has not been ignored by 
previous studies on this topic since Saal et al. (2007) pioneered by integrating quality 
adjusted outputs in TFP estimates for English and Welsh WaSCs. However, they focused 
only on analyzing the effect of exogenous variables on the productivity growth of the 
English and Welsh water companies. In other words, none of the previous studies assessing 
the TFP change based on stochastic methods have integrated quality-of-service to 
customers as operating variables that might influence input requirements.  
Against this background, the objectives of this paper are threefold. The first is to analyze 
the impact of regulation on the productivity growth and its drivers, namely, efficiency, 
technical and scale changes of the English and Welsh WoCs from 1993 to 2009. It should 
be highlighted that regulation is essential for leading water companies towards long-term 
sustainability [Molinos-Senante and Sala-Garrido, 2016]. The second objective is to 
explore explanatory variables (external factors and quality of service) affecting the 
productivity changes of WoCs. Finally, an X factor for each WoC is proposed to be applied 
in CPI-X price regulation. 
To the best of our knowledge, only Bottasso and Conti [2009b] focused on the performance 
assessment of English and Welsh WoCs instead of WaSCs or both WaSCs and WoCs. 
Moreover, their study only involved 144 observations since the period observed was 
1995/96-2004/05. In this context, our study extends significantly the period of time 
analyzed. The main objective of Bottasso and Conti [2009b] was to evaluate the presence 
of scale economies in the UK WoCs. By contrast, our study goes much further because it 
also evaluates the contributions of technical and efficiency changes to productivity growth 
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of WoCs. Our paper also innovates with respect to the explanatory variables of productivity 
change of English and Welsh water companies since quality-of-service variables are also 
integrated into the model.  
The methodology and results of this research are of great interest from the policy point of 
view. First, the methodology applied allows estimating an X factor for each WoC, which is 
essential to promote innovation and competition in the CPI-X price-regulation framework. 
Second, the integration of quality of service into the assessment provides essential 
information to the water regulator to develop policies (incentives or new standards) to 
improve the sustainability of the urban water cycle. 
2. THE ENGLISH AND WELSH WATER INDUSTRY 
The water and sewerage industry in England and Wales was privatized in 1989 and before 
privatization there were 10 Regional Water Authorities responsible for the water and 
sewerage supply in England and Wales and 20 Statutory Water companies, which were 
already privatized companies that were only responsible for the supply of water. After 
1989, the Regional Water Authorities were privatized and formed the WaSCs and the 
Statutory Water Companies became WoCs. While in 1993 the total number of companies 
was 30, they were 22 in 2008 due to mergers and acquisitions. The 10 WaSCs are 
responsible for the supply of water in areas that are not supplied by the WoCs, and the 
collection, treatment and disposal of sewerage in all areas. Due to mergers and takeovers 
between WaSCs/WoCs and WoCs/WoCs occurred during the period 1993-2010, the 
number of WoCs fell since privatization. In 1993 there were 20 WoCs and subsequent 
mergers in 1997 and 1998 led to a reduction in the number of WoCs, from 20 to 16. Further 
mergers between WaSCs/WoCs and WoCs/WoCs in 2010, reduced the number of WoCs to 
12. There are three regulatory bodies in the UK water and sewerage industry. The Office of 
Water Services (Ofwat), which is the economic regulator and sets the price limits for each 
company every five years, the Environment Agency (EA), which is responsible for 
pollution control, licensing and regulation of water abstraction, and the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate (DWI), which is responsible for controlling and monitoring drinking water 
quality. 
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In England and Wales, water industry is regulated based on the RPI-K price-cap 
methodology [Saal and Reid, 2004]. K can be decomposed into two factors, namely, Q and 
X, where Q is the price increase necessary to finance the required environmental and 
quality improvements and X is the productivity offset [Bottasso and Conti, 2009a]. At 
privatization in 1989, price limits were set by the Secretary of State for a period of ten years 
and were, on average, RPI +5.2 per annum for the industry, RPI+5 per annum for WaSCs 
and RPI+6.1 per annum for WoCs. The K factor was set at a high level in order to make up 
for years of underinvestment before privatization and to ensure that the shares of the public 
companies would be attractive to potential investors. However, as documented in past 
studies [see for instance Maziotis et al. 2015], the first price caps were relatively lax and as 
a result, Ofwat exercised its right to reset price caps in 1994. Thus, the average K factor 
after the 1994 review was RPI+0.9 for the industry, RPI+1.0 for the WaSCs and RPI-0.4 
for the WoCs, representing a considerable tightening of price caps [Ofwat, 1994]. This 
continued in the price review of 1999 with an average K factor of RPI-2.1 for the industry, 
RPI-2.0 for the WaSCs and RPI-2.8 for the WoCs [Ofwat, 1999]. In the 2004 price review 
the K factor increased again to an average of 4.2% per annum [Ofwat, 2004b], whereas in 
2009 Ofwat published its final price determinations suggesting an average K factor of 
RPI+0.5 per annum for WaSCs ,and RPI+0.3 per annum for WoCs for the next five years 
[Ofwat, 2009]. 
The determination of X-factors in the UK water and sewerage industry, and therefore of 
price limits, is carried out through benchmarking techniques, which provide information 
about the relative performance of companies. As there are companies that are regulated 
under the same framework, the regulator can compare the performance of each company 
against the performance of the others in the industry. When establishing price limits, Ofwat 
uses cross section econometric techniques and unit cost models to assess operating 
expenditure (OPEX) and capital expenditure (CAPEX) relative efficiency separately, for 
water and sewerage services. For instance, operating expenditure relative efficiency for 
water services is derived by the use of four econometric models: water distribution, 
resources and treatment, power and business activities. OPEX efficiency of sewerage 
services is derived using two econometric models, namely network including power and 
large sewerage treatment works and three unit cost models, namely small sewerage 
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treatment works, sludge treatment and disposal and business activities [Ofwat, 2005a]. 
Once the most efficient company has been determined by Ofwat from these models, then 
the regulator tests how much each company needs to reduce its actual costs to appear as 
efficient as the most efficient company. Finally, Ofwat also takes into consideration factors 
that are not included in the efficiency models, called “special factors”, for instance the high 
levels of deprivation in a region supplied by a water company which might result in high 
levels of bad debt.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
To explore the input-output relationship affecting the performance of the water industry, we 
adopt an input-distance function estimated using a translog function following Orea [2002] 
and Coelli et al. [2003]. The input-distance function provides an input-oriented measure of 
technical efficiency by finding the maximum possible radial contraction of an input that can 
produce a given quantity of output. The nature of production and regulation in the water 
industry in England and Wales justifies the use of an input-distance function rather than an 
output-distance function. In this context, water companies do not seek to increase outputs 
given an exogenous input allocation but rather try to reduce input use for a given 
exogenous output level, such as the water produced or the number of customers. The 
relationship can be stated formally as 
𝑑𝑖𝐼(𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡) = max {Ф: (
𝑋𝑖𝑡
Ф
)  ∈ 𝐿(𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑌𝑖𝑡), Ф > 0 },        (1) 
where Ф is the distance by which the input vector can be deflated, and the input set 𝐿(𝑋, 𝑌) 
represents the set of all input vectors that can produce the output vector. We follow the 
axioms of Färe and Primont [1995], according to which the input-distance function has the 
following properties: (i) 𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑋, 𝑌) is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogenous 
and concave in 𝑋, and non-increasing and quasi-concave in 𝑌; (ii) 𝑋 belongs to the input set 
of 𝑌 if and only if 𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑋, 𝑌) > 1. When a company operates on the frontier of the period 
𝑡 technology, isoquant 𝐿(𝑋, 𝑌), then 𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑋, 𝑌) = 1. 
The translog function can be used as a second-order approximation to a true but unknown 
technology. This characteristic is of particular interest because it reduces the estimation 
bias resulting from an improper assumption concerning functional form [Saal et al., 2007]. 
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For 𝑁 (𝑖: 1, … , 𝑁) companies observed in 𝑇 (𝑡: 1, … , 𝑇) time periods, 𝑀 (𝑚: 1, … , 𝑀) 
outputs and 𝐾 (𝑘: 1, … , 𝐾) inputs, the translog input-distance function is specified as 
follows: 
ln 𝑑𝐼(𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡) =  𝑇𝐿(𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜋𝑚 ln 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  
1
2
 𝑀𝑚=1 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑛
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑡 ln 𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝑀
𝑚=1
 ∑ 𝑘 ln 𝑦𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
1
2
  ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙
𝐿
𝑙=1 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘𝑖𝑡 ln 𝑦𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ ∑ 𝑚𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ln 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
 ∑ 𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ln 𝑦𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑡 + ∑  ln 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  1𝑡 + 
1
2
2𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
𝑀
𝑚=1  ,                                                              
(2) 
where 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡   is the m-th output quantity and 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the k-th input quantity for company 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡, and 𝜋, 𝛾, , 𝛽, , , 𝜓 and  are the parameters to be estimated. Equation (1) 
satisfies the properties of the distance function. 
Technical efficiency is given in our case by the ratio of the minimal inputs required to the 
actual inputs used. This ratio tells the regulator or the company manager the amount by 
which all inputs could be reduced for a given level of output. After the estimation of the 
parameters, the value of the input-oriented distance function is predicted as 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 =
𝑒−𝑢𝑖𝑡 , which varies between 0 and 1. A value of 1 means that the unit evaluated (WoC in 
this study) is efficient, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is an inefficiency index. Consequently, ln 𝑑𝐼 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡.  
As ln 𝑑𝐼(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑡) is not observable, we can select one of the outputs and take advantage 
of the distance function’s homogeneity properties to write an estimable distance-function 
specification. Indeed, homogeneity of degree 1 implies: 
∑ 𝜋𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚=1  + ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑛
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  
𝑀
𝑚=1 ∑ ∑ 𝜑𝑚𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜂𝑚 t = 1  
𝑀
𝑚=1 ,
𝑀
𝑚=1     (3) 
which will be satisfied if ∑ 𝜋𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚=1 = 1 and ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑛 =
𝑀
𝑚=1 ∑ 𝜑𝑚𝑘 =
𝑀
𝑚=1 ∑ 𝜂𝑚 =
𝑀
𝑚=1 0.  
Homogeneity of degree 1 in input means also that 𝑑(𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑡) = 𝜏𝑑(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑡) ∀ 𝜏 > 0; 
normalizing the input-distance function by one of input is equivalent to setting 𝜏 = 1/𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑘  
and then 𝑑(𝑋𝑖𝑡/𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑘 , 𝑌𝑖𝑡) =
𝑑(𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑌𝑖𝑡,𝑡)
𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑘  [Mellah and Ben Amor, 2016]. Accounting for these 
restrictions in Eq. (2) yields the following estimating form: 
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− 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝜋𝑚
𝑀−1
𝑚=1 ln ?̃? 𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑛
𝑀−1
𝑛=1 ln ?̃?𝑚𝑖𝑡 ln ?̃?𝑛𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
𝐾−1
𝑘=1
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
 
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙
𝐾−1
𝑙=1 ln 𝑦𝑘𝑖𝑡 ln 𝑦𝑙𝑖𝑡 + ∑  ∑ 𝑚𝑘
𝑀−1
𝑘=1
𝑀−1
𝑚=1 ln ?̃?𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 
𝐾−1
𝑘=1  ∑ 𝑚
𝑀−1
𝑚=1 𝑙𝑛?̃?𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡 +
 ∑ 𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ln 𝑦𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑡 + 1𝑡 + 
1
2
2𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 ʓ𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡   −  𝑢𝑖𝑡   ,      (4) 
where ?̃?𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡
 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡. In this specification, the error term has 
two components: the symmetric error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡, which represents random error and is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed, 𝜈𝑖𝑡    ̴ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜈
2);  and the asymmetric 
error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡, which captures the inefficiency effects and is drawn from an exponential 
distribution, 𝑢𝑖𝑡   ̴ exp (𝜃) [Saal and Parker, 2006].  
Following the approach of Saal et al. [2007], we add 𝑝 exogenous operating characteristics, 
whose impact on the input requirements is captured in the term ∑ 
𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 ʓ𝑝𝑖𝑡. We also 
replace the single intercept parameter with firm-specific dummies 𝛼𝑖Di to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity that has not been specifically controlled for in the model 
[Greene, 2005, Kunbahakar et al., 2015]. The inclusion of firm-specific dummies is 
appropriate in our case as 13 years of data are observed, covering several regulatory 
changes, such as the imposition of new environmental and drinking-water quality regimes, 
and different price reviews from the regulator. Because of the many years considered in this 
study and the changes in the companies’ operating and management conditions, the firm-
specific dummies capture unobserved heterogeneity in the companies’ operating 
characteristics, which would otherwise not be controlled for in the model.  
As our approach is characterized by multiple inputs and outputs, TFP is measured as the 
ratio of the aggregate output produced relative to the aggregate input used. In our case 
study, a useful TFP change measure provides insight into potential productivity 
improvements. The widely used generalized Malmquist Index is the measure of TFP 
change from various sources of productivity change. In this paper, we follow the approach 
of Orea [2002], Saal and Parker [2006] and Mellah and Ben Amor [2016] for the 
parametric estimation of a translog input-oriented distance function. The parametric 
generalized Malmquist Index is written as follows: 
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ln (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1/𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡) = ln (𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1/𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡) +  
1
2
 (𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1/𝜕𝑡 + 𝜕ln𝐷𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑡) +  
1
2
 ∑ [(1 +𝑘=𝐾𝑘=1
 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1/𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦) + (1 +  𝜕ln𝐷𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦)] (𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡) ,         (5) 
where the three terms on the right side represent technical efficiency change (TEC), 
technological change (TC), and scale efficiency change (SEC), respectively. TEC 
represents the catching-up effect of the company. TC occurs as a feasible input-output 
combination set, which either expands or contracts. SEC refers to the movement of firm 
production along the boundary set, making use of its curvatures. Our model thus allows one 
to better evaluate the impact of SEC on productivity growth even if technology is 
characterized by globally decreasing or increasing returns to scale. Finally, following 
standard practice, we normalize the inputs, outputs and time variables around their mean 
values, and monotonicity and curvature conditions on the distance function’s partial 
derivatives with respect to inputs and outputs are imposed before estimation [O’ Donnell 
and Coelli, 2005; Saal and Parker, 2006; Saal et al., 2007; Mellah and Ben Amor, 2016].   
4. VARIABLE SPECIFICATION AND DATA 
The selection of variables was guided by a review of the literature [Worthington, 2014; See, 
2015; Mellan and Ben Amor, 2016], the specific cost drivers of the English and Welsh 
water industry such as the value of assets, the length of mains, number of employees [Saal 
et al., 2007; Molinos-Senante et al., 2014; CEPA, 2014; Maziotis et al., 2016a] and the 
available data. It should be noted that productivity assessment integrates physical 
parameters such as the volume of water supplied, economic parameters such as the 
operational, capital and labor costs [Jabran et al., 2016] and exogenous factors such as the 
proportion of water that is abstracted from rivers, reservoirs or boreholes, average pumping 
head, population density, proportion of metered properties [CEPA, 2014].  
The volume of drinking water distributed (𝑦1), expressed in megaliters per day, and the 
number of connected properties (𝑦2) were selected as outputs. Following Portela et al. 
[2011], the water distributed was considered as a proxy for the volume of water abstracted 
from several water sources and therefore does not include water leakage. Three variables 
were used as inputs: (i) capital stock (𝑥1); operating expenses (OPEX) as variable input 
usage (𝑥2); and (iii) labor (𝑥3). In general, the measurement of capital stock is a challenge 
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since these data are not readily available [Mellah and Ben Amor, 2016]. However, for the 
UK water industry, previous studies [Saal and Parker, 2006; Maziotis et al., 2015] 
measured this variable based on the inflation-adjusted modern-equivalent asset estimates of 
the replacement cost of net tangible fixed assets. Following the approach of Saal and Parker 
[2006], operating costs were deflated using the Office of National Statistics’ producer price 
index for material and fuels purchased in the collection, purification and treatment by the 
water industry. Operating expenses involve business costs, energy costs, and resource and 
treatment costs. In other words, they are total operating costs less labor costs. Labor was 
proxied by full-time equivalent (FTE) employee numbers, which are available for each 
WoC.  
A literature review [e.g. Marques et al., 2014; Ananda, 2014; Molinos-Senante et al., 
2015b] illustrated that a large variety of variables might be used as explanatory variables of 
water companies´ performances. Actually, there is no formal theory as to what should be 
the determinants of the performances of water companies. Based on extant literature [Saal 
et al., 2011; Marques et al. 2014; CEPA, 2014; Pinto et al., 2016; Brea-Solis et al., 2017] 
six exogenous variables were integrated in the assessment: (i) customer density; (ii) average 
pumping head; (iii) percentage of water taken from reservoirs; (iv) percentage of drinking-
water losses; (v) percentage of billing contacts (e.g., complaint and payment handling, 
meter reading, meter installation) not responded to within 5 working days, with respect to 
the total number of billing contacts; and (vi) percentage of bursts in mains per connected 
property. As Marques et al. (2014) pointed out, some factors are not completely exogenous 
for long run management of water companies, but in the short run the ability of the 
managers is limited and therefore they should be considered as potential explanatory 
factors.  
Our empirical application focused on the English and Welsh WoCs for the period 1993-
2009. The data used for estimation were retrieved from the “July Returns for the Water and 
Sewerage Industries in England and Wales” published by Ofwat each year. The panel is 
unbalanced due to the consolidation process that occurred in the UK water industry. Thus, 
the number of WoCs declined over the sample period due to both WoC/WoC and 
WaSC/WoC mergers [Saal and Parker, 2006]. When mergers occurred between firms of 
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similar size, we considered the merged entity as a new firm entering the panel, whereas if a 
WoC was acquired by a WaSC, we simply dropped the company from the sample [Bottasso 
et al., 2011]. In 2009, Ofwat published new accounting requirements as part of the wider 
process of further developing competition in the water industry. These new reporting 
requirements are seen by Ofwat as a necessary first step to improve data quality, before 
such accounting separation could be finalized in updated regulatory accounting guidelines 
(RAGs)a [Ofwat, 2009a]. Hence, these changes in the UK water and sewerage regulatory 
framework did not allow us to collect consistent data to accurately assess the productivity 
growth of water companies in subsequent years [Maziotis et al., 2016b]. Therefore, our 
study involves 243 observations. The descriptive statistics for the variables are shown in 
Table 1. 
 Variable Average Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
OUTPUTS 
Water distributed (106 l/d) 214.034 198.637 27.990 899.321 
Connected properties (000s) 325.034 289.958 43.400 1269.380 
INPUTS 
Capital stock (106 £) 1036.640 936.172 132.887 3872.890 
Operating expenses (106 £) 23.315 21.342 2.917 114.857 
Labour (FTE) 318.887 246.958 63.000 1083.000 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
Customers´ density (population/ water area) 
(000s/m2) 
540 332 215 2800 
Water losses (%) 0.134 0.028 0.088 0.224 
Average pumping head (Nr) 4.794 0.343 4.018 5.365 
Billing contacts not responded to within 5 
working days (%) 
0.955 0.068 0.611 1.000 
Bursts in mains per connected property (%) 1.008 1.035 0.170 7.548 
Water from reservoirs (%) 0.935 0.127 0.460 1.000 
Table 1. Summary statistics of variables 
Source: Own elaboration based on Ofwat data 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The estimated parameters of the distance functions are reported in Table 2. We also check 
if the input-distance function satisfies monotonicity and curvature conditions, i.e., non-
decreasing and concave in inputs, and non-increasing and quasi-concave in outputs. The 
results confirm that the estimated function is non-decreasing in inputs and non-increasing in 
outputs, as shown by the first-order coefficients of inputs and outputs, respectively. 
                                                          
a Interested readers can consult the Regulatory accounting guidelines 2016-17 published by Ofwat at its 
webpage: www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/prs_in1609RAG1617.pdf  
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Moreover, the Hessian matrix of the translog input-distance function with the second-order 
coefficients and the interaction term between inputs as elements is negative semi-definite 
[Mellah and Ben Amor, 2016]. Every principal minor of odd order is non-positive and 
every principal minor of even order is non-negative [Simon and Blume, 1994]. The 
condition of quasi-concavity in output is only partially satisfied at the sample meanb. This 
does not imply the absence of an underlying cost-minimization process but may reflect the 
inability of the translog input-distance function to approximate the true input distance over 
the range of the data [Wales, 1977]. As Färe et al. [2010] and Wolf et al. [2010] noted, the 
translog function may lose flexibility when subjected to curvature restrictions. Overall, the 
estimated translog input-distance function is acceptable.      
Variable Parameter Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T - stat 
Water distributed 𝜉1 -0.423 0.088 -4.830* 
Connected properties 𝜉2 -0.538 0.097 -5.548* 
Capital 𝜋1 0.445 0.033 13.679* 
OPEX 𝜋2 0.436 0.048 9.031* 
Time 𝜓1 -0.003 0.002 -1.749** 
Capital2 ϒ1,1 -1.068 0.202 -5.280* 
OPEX2 ϒ2,2 -0.497 0.441 -1.126 
Capital*OPEX ϒ1,2 0.868 0.280 3.095* 
Water distributed*Capital 𝜑1,1 -0.681 0.268 -2.539* 
Water distributed*OPEX 𝜑1,2 -1.178 0.340 -3.466* 
Connected properties*Capital 𝜑2,1 0.457 0.289 1.582 
Connected properties*OPEX 𝜑2,1 1.497 0.364 4.114* 
Water distributed2 ϐ1,1 -0.435 0.356 -1.220 
Connected properties2 ϐ2,2 -0.833 0.491 -1.697** 
Water distributed*Connected properties ϐ1,2 0.560 0.417 1.342 
Capital*Time 𝜂1 0.019 0.010 1.860** 
OPEX*Time 𝜂2 -0.031 0.013 -2.370* 
Water distributed*Time 𝜅1 0.061 0.014 4.343* 
Connected properties*Time 𝜅2 -0.067 0.015 -4.368* 
Time2 𝜓2 0.000 0.001 -0.318 
Density 𝜒1 0.146 0.062 2.353* 
Density2 𝜒2 0.011 0.068 0.160 
% distribution losses 𝜒3 0.188 0.146 1.286 
Average pumping head 𝜒4 -0.159 0.012 -12.989* 
% billing contacts  𝜒5 0.113 0.055 2.058* 
% bursts in mains 𝜒6 0.039 0.010 4.031* 
% of water taken from reservoirs 𝜒7 0.191 0.052 3.706* 
 
                                                          
b In our model, 77% of the observations satisfy quasi-concavity in output, while 56 observations (23%) 
violate this condition. 
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Θ 
 
15.309 1.596 9.594* 
𝜎𝑣  
0.021 0.005 4.324* 
Log likelihood 354.640 
   
Average technical efficiency 0.9388 
   
Table 2. Estimated parameters of input distance function 
Notes: Labour input is the dependent variable 
* Coefficients are statistically significant from zero at the 5% level 
** Coefficients are statistically significant from zero at the 10% level 
The firm-specific dummies are all statistically different from zero. Note that a negative 
coefficient suggests an increase (decrease) in technical efficiency (inefficiency), and the 
reverse is also true. Since all variables have been normalized around their means, the first-
order coefficients of outputs and inputs can be, respectively, interpreted as distance-
function output and input elasticities for the average WoC of the sample. 
The output elasticities are statistically significant and suggest that creating more water-
connected properties requires more input requirements than providing additional volumes 
of water. This also evident from the second-order coefficient of water volumes and water-
connected properties. The scale elasticity, the sum of the inverses of the output elasticities, 
is 1.04 at the sample mean, which implies that a 1% increase in outputs will require an 
increase in input of 0.96%. This finding is consistent with other studies that reported 
economies of scale for English and Welsh WoCs [Bottasso et al., 2011]. As far as the input 
elasticities are concerned, they are all positive and statistically different from zero, 
implying that the distance function is increasing with respect to inputs. The input 
elasticities of capital, operating expenses and labor are 0.445, 0.436 and 0.118, 
respectively. Labor input was used as the normalized variable in the distance function, so 
its elasticity is recovered from the sum of capital and operating-expense (OPEX) 
elasticities. This finding suggests that both capital and operating expenses are the main 
drivers of increased input requirements to abstract, treat and distribute water to downstream 
users. The second-order coefficient of water distribution and the water-connected property 
is positive and insignificant, which suggests that these outputs are not complementary. This 
finding is consistent with the results of Saal Parker [2006] and Bottasso et al. [2009b]. The 
second-order coefficient of inputs with respect to capital and operating expenses suggest 
that input requirements increase more when additional capital investment increases than 
when operating expenses increase. This is also evident when looking at the interaction term 
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between time and inputs. Capital elasticity over time is positive and statistically significant, 
which means that WoCs have carried out substantial capital-investment programs since 
privatization. The estimated coefficient of the time factor is negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that the sample-average firm has undergone technological regression 
from 1994 to 2009 at a small rate of 0.28%. The time-squared coefficient is relatively small 
and insignificant, suggesting that the estimated rate of technical change has been further 
declining, by 0.02% per year. The coefficients of time related to each of the input variables 
are statistically significant, suggesting that technical change has resulted in the use of 
capital and the reduction of operating expenses. The statistically significant parameter of 
the interaction term between time and outputs suggests that technical change increases the 
relative magnitude of connection elasticity, whereas it decreases the relative magnitude of 
the elasticity of the amount of water delivered.   
Looking at the estimated parameters of the exogenous factors, it is concluded that the 
elasticity of input requirements with respect to density is positive and statistically 
significant. This implies that increased density reduces input requirements, which may be 
explained by the fact that a company with a relatively high customer to area-size ratio 
might use shorter pipes and hence have lower distribution costs [Torres and Maurison, 
2006]. Increased billing contacts not dealt with within five working days reduces input 
requirements, which implies that companies had already achieved high levels of service to 
customers [Ofwat, 2004a; 2005b]. The elasticity of input requirements with respect to 
reservoirs is positive and significant. This implies that water taken from reservoirs does not 
require higher inputs than water taken from rivers or groundwater resources, which may be 
more energy intensive than reservoirs and therefore might require higher inputs. Finally, the 
estimated parameter of bursts per connected property is positive and significant, whereas 
water losses are still positive but insignificant. This implies that increased investments in 
reducing bursts or water losses may reduce long-term input requirements because of input-
saving effects resulting from the investment in technologies that improve prediction of 
bursts in mains and manage water leakage. It should be noted that customer research 
carried out by Ofwat and other stakeholders suggested that customers in general believe 
that water companies in England and Wales have achieved a broadly satisfactory level of 
service in relation to costs [Ofwat, 2004a; 2005; 2009b].   
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Table 3 illustrates the trends in the average, maximum and minimum efficiency levels of 
WoCs over the period from 1993/94 to 2008/09.  
 
 
 
 
 
Year Average Maximum Minimum 
1993-94 0.927 0.989 0.678 
1994-95 0.933 0.992 0.737 
1995-96 0.926 0.991 0.707 
1996-97 0.936 0.992 0.722 
1997-98 0.942 0.990 0.824 
1998-99 0.929 0.991 0.796 
1999-00 0.938 0.991 0.820 
2000-01 0.957 0.978 0.900 
2001-02 0.963 0.987 0.910 
2002-03 0.956 0.989 0.897 
2003-04 0.941 0.991 0.838 
2004-05 0.939 0.993 0.736 
2005-06 0.945 0.985 0.852 
2006-07 0.936 0.984 0.805 
2007-08 0.933 0.988 0.781 
2008-09 0.949 0.988 0.843 
Table 3. Average, maximum and minimum efficiency scores of English and Welsh water only 
companies.   
Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the trend in the efficiency levels of 
WoCs. First, the tightening of the regulatory regime till 2001/02 had a positive impact on 
the efficiency levels of WoCs, but did not have a positive effect on companies’ efficiency 
levels in the subsequent years. Moreover, since the WoCs’ average and maximum 
efficiency levels were relatively high at privatization, it was difficult to achieve substantial 
efficiency gains after privatization. Finally, the minimum efficiency levels have improved 
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considerably since privatization, which means that price-cap regulation had a positive 
impact on those companies that were less inefficient when privatized. 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of total factor productivity change (TFPC), technical efficiency change 
(TEC), technical change (TC) and scale efficiency change (SEC) of the English and Welsh 
water only companies. 
The year-by-year average for TFP change (TFPC) and its decomposition into EC, TC and 
SEC are depicted in Figure 1. TFPC increased till 1994/95 by 2.52%, with technical change 
being the major determinant of productivity growth. The tight 1994 price review led to a 
declining trend for TFPC, however it remained at a positive level. In the year ending 1998, 
average technical change remained at 0.40% per year, suggesting that the potential for 
productivity improvements through technical change still remained in the industry. The 
further tightening of the regulatory regime created more volatility in TFPC. In the year 
ending 2001/02, TFPC remained at 0.56% per year with efficiency change increasing by 
1.26% per year. Technical change and scale change had consistent negative impacts on 
productivity growth. However, the efficiency gains were not sustained the following years 
and in 2004/05, TFPC dropped by -1.44%, with TC and TEC being the major determinants 
of deterioration in productivity. This finding is consistent with Portela et al. [2011] and 
Molinos-Senante et al. [2014; 2016b] where the authors concluded that less efficient 
companies improved their performance towards the frontier company whereas the frontier 
company did not continue to improve its performance. This conclusion reinforces Ofwat’s 
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statement in 2004 that ‘the improvement in relative efficiency since 1999 is striking. We 
now see companies clustering around the industry frontier for operating costs and capital 
expenditure, with several companies showing at or near best in class performance in both 
operating and capital maintenance efficiencies’ [Ofwat, 2004b].  Moreover, managing a 
stepped change in price limits to remove excess returns from past price reviews and 
continuing high capital investment to improve overall performance was challenging for the 
frontier companies [Molinos-Senante et al. 2016a]. The introduction of new prices in 2005 
led to small efficiency gains in the year ending 2006, which were offset by substantial 
reductions in TC and scale effect. Overall, the imposition of the price-cap regulation regime 
was meant to stimulate efficiency improvements and TC; in the longer term, it was not 
particularly effective in maintaining efficiency and productivity growth. Evidence of 
technical regress for WoCs was also found in Saal et al. [2011] where the authors estimated 
a quadratic total cost function for the period 1993-2009 without controlling for exogenous 
factors. In contrast, other authors such as Bottasso and Conti [2009b] reported positive 
technical change for WoCs by estimating a variable cost function for the period 1995-2005. 
Breas-Solis et al. [2017] also found technical progress by estimating an input distance using 
both WaSCs and WoCs. Therefore, the model specification, the choice of outputs/inputs, 
the sample period, the inclusion or not exogenous factors and the type of companies can 
lead to different conclusions with regard to the existence of technical progress. We also 
note that there might be other factors beyond the regulatory cycle that have impacted 
companies’ productivity growth. For instance, water companies use substantial amounts of 
electricity to treat water and in 2005/06 electricity prices increased more than the producer 
price index for material and fuels purchased in the collection, purification and treatment 
(the index used to deflate operational costs). Moreover, Molinos-Senante et al. (2016a) 
noted that exogenous climate characteristics might explain the decline in companies’ 
performance. For instance, during the extended dry period which started in the winter of 
2004–05 water companies successfully minimized the risk of serious supply problems by 
using restrictions and undertaking additional water efficiency programs, increasing 
therefore their costs [Ofwat, 2007]. 
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Figure 2. Cumulative measures of total factor productivity change (TFPC), technical 
efficiency change (TEC), technical change (TC) and scale efficiency change (SEC) of the 
English and Welsh water only companies. 
Figure 2 shows cumulative TEC, TC, SEC and TFP growth indices for an average WoC. 
The 1994 tight price review had a positive impact on TFPC, which increased by 5.4% in 
1998 relative to 1993, mainly due to an improvement in TC. This finding is consistent with 
Bottasso and Conti [2009b] where the authors reported small but positive rates of technical 
change for WoCs. Using both WaSCs and WoCs, Ashton [2008] reported a rate of 
technical change 1.8% during the period 1991-1996 and Portela et al. [2011] reported an 
increasing trend for technical change for the years 1993-1997. A declining trend was then 
observed for TFPC for the subsequent years, which was attributed to decreases in SEC and 
TEC. In 2000, TFPC increased by 4.8% relative to 1993 due to a substantial increase in 
technical change of 5.36% and small efficiency gains. The 1999 price review helped less 
efficient companies to improve their efficiency, whereas the best performing companies 
continued to improve their performance but at a lower rate. This finding is consistent with 
Bottasso and Conti [2009b] and Portela et al. [2011] where the industry showed an 
increasing trend in technical change till 2000 but in the second half of the regulatory period 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
TFPC 1.000 1.001 1.026 1.038 1.052 1.054 1.046 1.048 1.054 1.051 1.030 1.004 0.992 0.977 0.939 0.904 0.866
TEC 1.000 0.993 0.999 0.988 1.000 0.999 0.992 1.001 1.014 1.018 1.010 0.996 0.994 0.999 0.991 0.988 0.992
TC 1.000 1.012 1.023 1.041 1.054 1.059 1.058 1.054 1.049 1.042 1.033 1.022 1.009 0.992 0.968 0.939 0.903
SEC 1.000 0.996 1.004 1.009 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.993 0.991 0.991 0.987 0.986 0.989 0.986 0.980 0.977 0.971
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technical change falls.  In 2004/05, the average TFPC index fell below its level at the first 
years of privatization. Deterioration of TFPC is attributed to a decrease in TC. TEC and 
SEC also decreased, but at lower rates. The introduction of new prices in 2005 did not 
improve the average company’s productivity growth, which declined substantially due to 
substantial reductions in TC and SEC. Overall, relative to 1993, TFPC dropped by almost 
14%, mainly due to the reduction in TC by 10%, whereas SEC dropped by 3% and TEC by 
1%. This finding implies that it will be wiser for water companies to not base productivity 
plans only on technical efficiency but to focus further on scale efficiency and technological 
progress.     
Linking the TFPC results with the regulatory cycle, it is concluded that the 1994 price 
review had a positive impact on productivity growth, which was attributed to TC, i.e., the 
shift to the efficient frontier. This finding suggests that during the years 1994-2000, the 
frontier company improved its managerial practices significantly. The scale effect became 
negative during the years 1997-2000, which implies that the acquisition / mergers of WoCs 
from WaSCs did not have a positive impact on WoCs’ productivities. Moreover, the 
additional tight price review in 1999 had a positive effect on WoCs’ performances. During 
the years 2001 – 2005, less efficient companies moved closer to the frontier company, the 
productivity of which was following a downward trend. This finding is consistent with 
Portela et al. [2011] and Ofwat's statement that several companies were at or near the 
frontier company in terms of both operating and capital-maintenance efficiencies [Ofwat, 
2004b; Portela et al., 2011]. TC also improved but followed a downward trend, whereas the 
scale effect remained constantly negative. Overall, the 2004 price review did not further 
accelerate efficiency changes or stimulate technical changes. There were deteriorations in 
productivity for both best firms and other firms, meaning that less efficient companies did 
not move closer to the frontier, nor did the benchmark company continue to improve 
productivity. This finding is consistent with the results of Molinos-Senante et al. [2014], 
which showed that during the years 2004 – 2008, the UK water industry experienced a 
decline in productivity growth mainly due to technical regression.  
From a policy and managerial perspective, this study allowed the identification of the 
primary drivers of productivity change and the assessment of the impact of regulation on 
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companies’ performances. This step is of great importance, as it will aid regulators and 
water companies in defining measures that can be employed to improve performance in a 
regulated industry. Moreover, the utility’s regulators can use this type of modeling and the 
results to propose X factors for the WoCs over a five-year period. This was illustrated by 
using results from the year 2008 as an example. 
Company 
Technical 
efficiency 
Potential 
productivity 
growth 
through catch-
up 
50% 
catch-up 
for total 
costs 
Catch-
up (%) 
per year 
Continuing 
improvement 
factor 
Required 
productivit
y Growth 
X-
factor 
WoC1 0.859 1.149 1.075 1.015 1.010 1.025 2.466% 
WoC2 0.931 1.061 1.031 1.006 1.010 1.016 1.611% 
WoC3 0.986 1.002 1.001 1.000 1.010 1.010 1.019% 
WoC4 0.975 1.013 1.006 1.001 1.010 1.011 1.131% 
WoC5 0.905 1.092 1.046 1.009 1.010 1.019 1.910% 
WoC6 0.978 1.010 1.005 1.001 1.010 1.011 1.097% 
WoC7 0.781 1.265 1.132 1.025 1.010 1.035 3.541% 
WoC8 0.977 1.011 1.005 1.001 1.010 1.011 1.109% 
WoC9 0.976 1.011 1.006 1.001 1.010 1.011 1.114% 
WoC10 0.988 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.010 1.010 1.097% 
WoC11 0.959 1.030 1.015 1.003 1.010 1.013 1.301% 
WoC12 0.885 1.115 1.058 1.011 1.010 1.021 2.139% 
Average WoC 0.933 1.058 1.029 1.006 1.010 1.016 1.581% 
Table 4. Illustrative calculation of X – factors for the English and Welsh water only companies 
(WoCs)  
The potential (anticipated) productivity improvement of WoC1 obtained by catching up to 
company WoC10 over time is 0.988/0.859 = 1.149. Assuming that WoC1 achieves 50% 
catch-up for total costs over a 5-year period, then its productivity should improve by 
[1.000 + (1.125 − 1)/2] = 1.075 over a 5-year period. That means that WoC1 should 
catch up to the best firm (1.075)
1
5⁄ = 1.015 per year. Assuming that the regulator entity 
requires a 1%  continuing improvement factor (technical change), the required productivity 
growth or X factor for WoC1 is 𝑋 = 1.015 𝑥 1.01 = 1.025, or 2.46% per year. 
Analogously, illustrative X factors are computed for the other WoCs and for the average 
company. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The assessment of the productivity change over time and its determinants is of great 
importance for regulators when setting urban water tariffs. In a regulatory framework, such 
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as that of England and Wales, where water companies consolidate and make up a 
technologically mature industry, some exogenous factors become significant in the 
assessment of the performances of water companies. This issue is of great importance for 
the English and Welsh water industry which is regulated based on RPI-K price-cap 
methodology. Given the importance of this topic, several studies have aimed to assess TFP 
of water companies in England and Wales. However, they focused on assessing the 
productivity performances of WaSCs or both WaSCs and WoCs, whereas the only study 
that specifically addressed the assessment of WoCs´ performances aimed to evaluate the 
presence of scale economies. Hence, this study adds to the debate over the impact of 
regulation on WoCs’ productivity, technology and scale changes.     
This paper reports our empirical research dealing with the estimation of technology, 
assessment of efficiency and identification of determinants of productivity change in WoCs 
in England and Wales during the years 1993 - 2009. To achieve this, an input-distance 
function is used to estimate and decompose the productivity change into TEC, TC and SEC 
using stochastic frontier techniques. We also explore the impacts of several exogenous and 
service-quality variables on companies’ efficiencies.  Finally, we show how the utility’s 
regulator can use this type of modeling and the results to calculate illustrative X factors for 
the WoCs. 
The primary findings of our empirical research can be summarized as follows. First, the 
1994 and 1999 price reviews stimulated technical change, and there were small efficiency 
gains. During the years 1993/94 – 2001/02, the best company improved its productivity 
over time and several companies were at or near the frontier company in terms of both 
operating and capital-maintenance efficiencies. Mergers between WoCs or WaSCs and 
WoCs did not have positive effects on WoC performance, as the scale change was negative. 
The 2004 price review did not speed up TEC or stimulate TC, whereas SEC remained 
negative. Second, the average and maximum efficiency levels of WoCs had been relatively 
high at privatization, so it was difficult to achieve substantial efficiency gains after 
privatization. Moreover, the minimum efficiency levels have been improved considerably 
since privatization, which means that price-cap regulation had a positive impact on those 
companies that were less inefficient when privatized. Furthermore, the inclusion of several 
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exogenous factors did not broadly increase long-term input requirements. On average, 
companies reported relatively high efficiency levels during the period of study, which 
suggests that they had already been investing in cost-efficient technologies or using inputs 
with respect to exogenous factors in a cost-efficient way. Finally, an average WoC needs to 
improve its productivity or reduce its costs relative to the benchmarking company by 
1.58%. 
From a policy and managerial perspective, our empirical study is of great significance for 
researchers and policy makers for the following reasons. First, our methodology allows the 
identification of the factors that affect productivity change over time, which could aid 
regulators and managers to define measures that can be employed to improve performance 
in a regulated industry. Moreover, calculating appropriate X factors in price-cap regulation 
is essential to create incentives to improve the efficiency and productivity of water 
companies. Finally, it provides a better understanding of the relative importance of various 
productivity components, which is essential to water regulators and water companies for 
the sustainable and efficient management of the urban water cycle.  
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